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Sun: The Fundamental Right to Technology

THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO TECHNOLOGY
Haochen Sun*
Waves of technological progress in recent decades have
tremendously improved quality of life. Meanwhile, concerns about
technology-driven injustices, such as unfair distribution of wealth and
racial discrimination, have deepened. Experts have cautioned that new
technologies could have potentially devastating effects, claiming for
instance that artificialintelligence may lead to World War III. We are at
a crossroads, and how we harness technology now will determine the
future of humanity.
This Article presents a thought experiment, proposing that a new
fundamental right to technology be recognized under the U.S.
Constitution. Given that technology is of fundamental importance to
human dignity and equality, this new constitutional right is designed to
promote equitable distribution of technological benefits and to prevent
harmful applicationsof technologies. This proposal is made with the hope
that other countries may also recognize this fundamental right in
constitutionallaw, ensuring globalprotectionof the right to technology.
Based on an overview of fundamental rights protection under the
U.S. Constitution, the Article first discusses how the U.S. Supreme Court
has developed a liberal approach to identifying fundamental rights not
enumerated by the Constitution. It then applies this liberal approachto a
consideration of why the right to technology should be deemed an
unenumeratedfundamentalright. This Article further canvasses how this
newfundamental right wouldprotect collective interests in technological
benefits. It also explores how to resolve the potential tension between the
Intellectual Property Clause and protection of the right to technology.

* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Law & Technology Center, University of
Hong Kong Faculty of Law. I benefited greatly from presenting the first draft of this article at the

Rising Up to Legal Challenges in the Age of Artificial Intelligence conference.Iam grateful to Barton
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Lyria Bennett Moses, Frank Pasquale, Anna Wu, Po Jen Yap, and Peter Yu for their helpful
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"The identification and protection of fundamental rights is an enduring part
of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution.... The dynamic of our
constitutional system is that individuals need not await legislative action
before asserting a fundamental right."'
Justice Anthony Kennedy
I.

INTRODUCTION

We are at a crossroads with respect to harnessing technology to
determine the future of humanity. Waves of technological progress in
recent decades have resulted in breakthroughs such as 3D printing,
artificial intelligence ("Al"), new medicines, and renewable energy,
among many others, tremendously improving our quality of life.2
However, some technological breakthroughs have also raised serious
concerns about their potentially devastating effects. For example, leading
1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598, 2605 (2015).
TECH.
2018,
MIT
Technologies
2. 10
Breakthrough
https://www.technologyreview.com/lists/technologies/2018 (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol48/iss2/6

REV.,

2

Sun: The Fundamental Right to Technology

THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO TECHNOLOGY

20191

447

experts have cautioned that the rapid development of Al may lead to
World War II or even bring about humanity's end.4
Humanity's future thus depends in large part on the betterment of
technology justice.' How to address the deepening injustice caused by
6
technological progress is a pressing issue confronting the United States.
Hence, it is high time to decide whether the general public or a small group
of elites has the final say over distribution of the benefits of
technological progress.
Against this backdrop, this Article argues that a new fundamental
7
right to technology should be recognized under the U.S. Constitution.
Given that technology is of fundamental importance to human dignity and
equality, the new constitutional right, as envisioned herein, is designed to
promote equal distribution of the benefits of technological progress.'

3.

Ryan Browne, Alibaba'sJack Ma Suggests Technology Could Result in a New World War,

CNBC (Jan. 25, 2019, 9:31 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/23/alibaba-jack-ma-suggeststechnology-could-result-in-a-new-world-war.html; Alex Hem, Elon Musk Says Al Could Lead to
Third World War, THEGUARDIAN(Sept.4,2017,6:58 AM),https://www.theguardian.com/technolog

y/2017/sep/04/elon-musk-ai-third-world-war-vladimir-putin.
4. See BRETT FRSCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 1 (2018) ("As
we collectively race down the path toward smart techno-social systems that efficiently govern more
and more of our lives, we run the risk of losing ourselves along the way.").
5. See AMBER MIEKLE, TECHNOLOGY JUSTICE: A CALL TOACTION 3, 7, 15, 19, 25 (2016),

https://infohub.practicalaction.org/bitstream/handle/11283/593323/Technology%20Justice%20a%2
Ocall%20to%20action%20web%201inks.pdffsequence=9.
6. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 191-92 (2015) (arguing that the black box society is unjust
because "[d]ata is becoming staggering in its breadth and depth, yet often the information most
important to us is out of our reach, available only to insiders"); Noel Sharkey, End Technological
AM),
10:44
2018,
11,
(Dec.
FORBES
Safe?.,
Face
Is
Your
Injustice!
https://www.forbes.com/sites/noelsharkey/2018/12/11/end-technological-injustice-make-the-safeface-pledge-today/#754275769af8 ("Everywhere new technology is being exploited to oppress the
already oppressed. Whether you're a woman, poor, an ethnic minority or just from the wrong side of

the zip code, there's an algorithm to oppress you."); Gillian Tett, The Digital World's Other Equality
Problem, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/5d444c84-523d-l1e3-8c4200144feabdcO.
7. Several articles published online have suggested creating a constitutional right to
technology. But the nature of that right entirely differs from that of the fundamental right to
technology I propose in this Article. For articles discussing the constitutional right to technology see
Marc Jonathan Blitz, A ConstitutionalRight to Use Thought-Enhancing Technology, in COGNITIVE
ENHANCEMENT: ETHICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 293, 297
(Fabrice Jotterand & Veljko Dubljevid eds., 2016); Nancy Leong, ConstitutionalRights in the Digital
Age, HUFFPOST (Sept. 18, 2014, 4:22 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/constitutional-rights-infirst-amendment b5601216; David Rothkopf, Is Unrestricted Internet Access a Modern Human

Right?, FOREIGN POL'Y (Feb. 2, 2015, 11:26 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/02/unrestricted

.

Time to Recognize Technology as a
-internet-access-human-rights-technology-constitution;
ConstitutionallyProtectedRight, CANADIAN LAWYER (Feb. 9,2015), https://www.canadianlawyerm
277 3
ag.com/author/na/time-to-recognize-technology-as-a-constitutionally-protected-right8. See infra Part ELB.
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To date, the U.S. courts have relied on the fundamental rights to free
speech, to bear arms, and to property in dealing with critical cases
pertaining to law and technology.' For example, the Supreme Court has
prohibited injustices arising from the use of speech-censoring
technologies on the basis of the First Amendment. The lower courts have
dealt with an array of cases concerned with issues of law and technology
justice,ranging from the use of 3D printers to manufacture guns' to police
requests for cell-site location information'2 and for cell phone owners to
reveal their passcodes.13 Should such hard cases appear before the
Supreme Court, it would likely tackle them by resorting to the First,
Second, and Fifth Amendments, according to some commentators.1 4
This Article shows that a fundamental right to technology offers an
alternative approach to dealing with technology-related issues under
constitutional law. It considers how the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment could protect this fundamental right to
technology as a new liberty. Such a right would allow the Constitution to
keep pace with legal demands created by new technologies and enable
courts to tackle new forms of injustice arising from them. 5
My proposal to create a new fundamental right to technology makes
three original contributions to the discourse on law, technology, and
9. See infra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
10. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2006, 2011-12 (2015); United States v. Am.
Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 205-06 (2003).
11. Washington v. U.S. Dep't of State, 318 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1251, 1263-64 (W.D. Wash.
2018); see also Gina Martinez, Why the Legal Battle over 3D-PrintedGuns May Prove Futile, TIME
(Aug. 1, 2018), http://time.com/5354963/3d-printed-guns-hard-to-stop.
12. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217-20 (2018); see also Adam Liptak, In
Ruling on Cellphone Location Data, Supreme CourtMakes Statement on DigitalPrivacy, N.Y.TIMES
(June 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/22/us/politics/supreme-court-warrants-cellphone-privacy.htm1.
13. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 88 N.E.3d 1178, 1180 (Mass. App. Ct. 2017); see also Tim
Cushing,Another CourtSays Compelled PasswordProductionDoesn't Violate the Fifth Amendment,
TECHDIRT (Dec. 18, 2017, 1:29 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20171214/09340938810/ano
ther-court-says-compelled-password-production-doesnt-violate-fifth-amendment.shtml.
14. See S.M., The Supreme CourtTakes a Public-Access TV Case, ECONOMIST (Oct. 17,2018),
https://www.economist.com/democracy-in-america/2018/10/17/the-supreme-court-takes-a-publicaccess-tv-case ("ManhattanCommunity Access Corp. v. Halleck. At first glance, the case looks like
a minor dispute between a local cable station and a pair of aggrieved videographers whose work was
banned from the airwaves. But the conflict goes to the heart of a fraught area of First Amendment law
that could have significant implications for media companies-from Twitter to National Public
Radio-that curate content on their platforms."); Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, How the New
Supreme Court May Tackle Tech's Big Questions, WIRED (Feb. 6, 2017, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2017/02/new-supreme-court-may-tackle-techs-big-quesions;
Danny
Yadron et al., Apple Accuses FBI of Violating ConstitutionalRights in iPhone Battle, GUARDIAN
(Feb. 25, 2016, 4:18 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/25/apple-fbi-iphoneencryption-request-response.
15. See infra Part I.
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justice. First, such a right would revitalize the Constitution and enable the
courts to rely upon it in tackling new forms of injustice arising from
technological breakthroughs. This Article identifies technology-based
discrimination as a new form of injustice in which conventional
fundamental rights lack the constitutional basis to intervene. 6 It is
concerned with the unfair distribution of the benefits of technological
progress through the administrative and legislative actions of the
government." This Article further demonstrates how the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would empower the new
fundamental right to technology to deal with such discrimination and the
injustices it causes."
Technology justice is also an issue for the international community.19
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") established the
human right to technology in 1948, stating that "[e]veryone has the
right ... to share in scientific advancement and its benefits."20 However,
more than seventy years later, this human right remains obscure, dormant,
and ineffective. 2 1 This Article proposes a constitutional, rights-based

16. See infra Part IV.A.
17. See infra PartWA.
18. See infra PartII.B.2.
19.

UNITED NATIONS ESCAP, INEQUALITY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC IN THE ERA OF THE 2030

AGENDA FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 62-77 (2018), https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/file

s/publications/ThemeStudyOnInequality.pdf; Erik Brynjolfsson et al., New World Order: Labor,
Capital, and Ideas in the Power Law Economy, FOREIGN AFF. (July/Aug. 2014),
(arguing that
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-06-04/new-world-order
"superstar-based technical change ... is upending the global economy"); Cory Doctorow,
Technology Is Making the World More Unequal. Only Technology Can Fix This, THE GUARDIAN
(May 31, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/may/31/technology-ismaking-the-world-more-unequal-only-technology-can-fix-this-cory-doctorow; Wim Naud6 & Paula
Nagler, Is Technological Innovation Making Society More Unequal?, UNITED NATIONS U. (Dec. 21,
2016), https://unu.edulpublications/articles/is-technological-innovation-making-society-more-unequ
al.html; Zia Qureshi, Globalization, Technology, andInequality:It's the Policies, Stupid, BROOKINGS
(Feb.16,2018),https://www.brookings.edulblog/up-front/2018/02/16/globalization-technology-andinequality-its-the-policies-stupid; Jeremy Williams, How Digital Technology Drives Inequality,
EARTHBOUND REP. (Oct. 11, 2017), https://earthbound.report/2017/10/11/how-digital-technologydrives-inequality.
20. GA. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 76 (Dec. 10, 1948).
21. Yvonne Donders, The Right to Enjoy the Benefits ofScientific Progress:In Search ofState
Obligations in Relation to Health, 14 MED. HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 371, 371 (2011),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3190088 ("After having received little attention
over the past decades, one of the least known human rights provisions in international human rights
law-the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications-has had its dust blown
off.") (citations omitted); Jessica M. Wyndham & Margaret Weigers Vitullo, Why the Right to Science
Matters for Everyone, OPENDEMOCRACY (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.opendemocracy.net/jessicam-wyndham-margaret-weigers-vitullo/why-right-to-science-matters-for-everyone ("Although nearly
70 years have passed since this right to science was first [articulated], the implications of the right
and its meaning for individuals and governments have never been fully articulated.").
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approach to address the global neglect of the human right to technology.22
Such an approach would not only raise awareness of the public's
collective interest in technology but also encourage individual members
of the public to take legal action to assert their fundamental right to
technology under the U.S. Constitution. The involvement of the U.S.
courts in adjudicating such legal disputes would enhance the protection
afforded by the new right. Were the proposed constitutional, rights-based
approach to be adopted by other countries, it would ultimately usher in a
global revolution in protecting the human right to technology.
The fundamental right to technology also offers a novel means of
addressing the tension between intellectual property ("IP") protection and
distributive justice. This Article argues that a core problem with the IP
Clause of the U.S. Constitution 2 3 is its protection of IP rights without
considering how to distribute the benefits of technological progress
equitably. In creating distributive justice mandates, the fundamental right
to technology would require that legislators and judges take seriously the
public's collective interests in its benefits, and, accordingly, reshape IP
legislation and adjudication to render them more conducive to the equal
distribution of these benefits.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Based on an
overview of fundamental rights protection under the U.S. Constitution,
Part H discusses how the U.S. Supreme Court has developed a liberal
approach to identifying fundamental rights not enumerated by the
Constitution. 2 4 Part III applies this liberal approach to a consideration of
why the right to enjoy technological benefits should be deemed an
unenumerated fundamental right. 25 It further canvasses how this new
fundamental right would protect collective interests in technological
benefits. 2 6 Part IV explores how to resolve the potential tension between
the IP Clause and protection of the right to technology.2 7

22. See infra Part M.
23. The IP Clause empowers Congress "[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries." U.S. CONT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra Part Il.
26. See infra Part Ill.
27. See infra Part IV.
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THE LIBERAL APPROACH TO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION

A.

ConstitutionalBases for FundamentalRights

Under the U.S. Constitution, some liberties are so important that they
can be deemed fundamental rights.2 8 The Constitution guards against any
encroachment upon such rights unless the government provides
compelling reasons for doing so.29 The first ten Amendments of the
Constitution, known as the Bill of Rights, enumerate certain fundamental
rights, such as freedom of expression and religion, the right to keep and
bear arms, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the right
to property.30
The Constitution also allows courts to recognize unenumerated
fundamental rights as liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 3 1 The Clause prescribes that no State shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." 32 To follow this constitutional mandate, courts circumspectly
analyze whether an unenumerated right constitutes a liberty deserving due
process protection as a fundamental constitutional right.3 3 For example,
nothing in the text of the Constitution expressly protects marriage as a
fundamental right. Yet, the Supreme Court has ventured to interpret
marriage as a liberty that merits due process protection and therefore
should be identified and protected as an unenumerated fundamental
28. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 812 (4th ed.
2011).
29. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, White,
Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[A]
government practice or statute which restricts 'fundamental rights' . . . is to be subjected to 'strict
scrutiny' and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling government purpose and, even then, only
if no less restrictive alternative is available.").
30. U.S. CONT. amends. I, H, IV, V; see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 847 (1992) ("The most familiar of the substantive liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment are those recognized by the Bill of Rights."); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925) ("[F]reedom of speech and of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from
abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.").

31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring) ("[T]he concept of liberty protects those personal rights that are
fundamental, and is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights.").

32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
33. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 926-27 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part) ("[T]he fundamental right of privacy protects
citizens against governmental intrusion in such intimate family matters as procreation, childrearing,
marriage, and contraceptive choice."); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("[T]here
are additional fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist alongside
those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments.").
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right.3 4 InLoving v. Virginia, 5 the Supreme Court struck down a statute
that prohibited interracial marriage, declaring that "[t]he freedom to marry
has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."3 6 Because the statute in
question prejudiced freedom of marriage-"one of the 'basic civil rights
of man,' fundamental to our every existence and survival"3 7 -the statute
"surely ... deprive[d] all the State's citizens of liberty without due
process of law."
The Supreme Court has embraced the identification and protection
of unenumerated fundamental rights as one of its core duties.39 Over the
course of a century of adjudication, rights so identified and protected in
addition to the right to marriage 4 0 include the right to interstate travel 4
and the right to parent one's children,42 among others.
The way in which the Supreme Court identifies fundamental rights
"has not been reduced to any formula." 4 3 Rather, it has stated that it is
necessary to vigilantly identify and justify individual interests that are so
fundamental that the government must afford them adequate protection."
This recognition process follows broad constitutional principles.45
B. A Liberal Approach to ProtectingFundamentalRights
Through a series of watershed cases, the Supreme Court has
harnessed and developed a liberal approach to interpreting the nature and
scope of liberties protected by the Due Process Clause as unenumerated
fundamental rights. This approach dynamically improves the separation
of powers by shedding new light on the role of the judiciary in protecting
fundamental rights, and revitalizes constitutional commitments to
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) ("The identification and protection of

fundamental rights is an enduring part of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution."); see also

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 759, 772 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) ("After the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, with its guarantee of due process protection against the
States, interpretation of the words 'liberty' and 'property' as used in Due Process Clauses became a
sustained enterprise, with the Court generally describing the due process criterion in converse terms
of reasonableness or arbitrariness.").

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,501 (1999).
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598.

45. Id. ("Thatprocess is guided by many ofthe same considerations relevant to analysis ofother
constitutional provisions that set forth broad principles rather than specific requirements.").
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protecting interests that are of the utmost value to individuals and society
as a whole. The liberal approach to identifying unenumerated fundamental
rights embodies three major components.
First, the liberal approach advocates a dynamic interpretation of the
nature and scope of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, which
empowers courts to identify unenumerated fundamental rights. Starting
with its Meyer v. Nebraska4 6 decision in 1923, the Supreme Court
attempted to provide a sweeping definition of liberty under the Due
Process Clause. 4 7Drawing on its previous rulings on the Clause, the Court
stated that liberty
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations
of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.4

8

Liberty, according to this statement, has two dimensions. First, it
protects bodily integrity, shielding individuals against harm caused to
their bodies.49 Second, liberty allows individuals to choose actions that are
essential to their achievement of happiness in orderly societies.5o Despite
providing such a broad-based definition, the Court took a common law
approach to protecting those liberties so long as they were recognized as
privileges." It did not, however, expressly elevate those liberties to
fundamental rights directly pursuant to the Due Process Clause.5 2
Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman5in 1961 marks
a critical turning point for the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of
fundamental rights protection 54 :

46. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
47. Id. at 399.
48. Id.
49. Then-Judge Cardozo argued that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has
a right to determine what shall be done with his own body" in relation to his medical needs.

Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E.92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
50. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401,403.
51. Id. at 400 ("[Plaintiffs] right to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct
their children, we think, are within the liberty of the amendment.").
52. See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "FundamentalRight" That DareNot Speak

Its Name, 117 HARV.L.REv. 1893,1934 (2004).
53. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
54. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544-45 (1977) (White, J.,
dissenting) ("[N]o one was more sensitive than Mr. Justice Harlan to any suggestion that his approach
to the Due Process Clause would lead to judges 'roaming at large in the constitutional field."').

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

454

[Vol. 48:445

[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific
guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This "liberty" is not
a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property;
the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear
arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on.
It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom
and
impositions
arbitrary
substantial
all
from
purposeless restraints ...5

This opinion asserts a broad and dynamic understanding of the nature
and scope of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. It
forthrightly affirms that the constitutional protection of the Due Process
Clause stretches to fundamental rights not specifically identified by the
Constitution. 56 This is because liberty, according to Justice Harlan, is a
broad-based concept not confined to the rights itemized by the
Constitution. 5 7Instead, it is a "rational continuum" that confers upon
courts the judicial power to recognize new fundamental rights.
Relying on this robust understanding of liberty, the Supreme Court
revolutionized constitutional rights protection by elevating privacy and
abortion to the status of unenumerated fundamental rights.5 The Court in
Roe v. Wade,5 9 while acknowledging that the Constitution is silent on the
right to privacy, held that privacy should be deemed a liberty under the
Due Process Clause and therefore protected as a fundamental right.' It
further founded women's fundamental right to abortion upon the right to
privacy, ruling that the latter "is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 6 In other words, the
right to abortion entitles women to make decisions for their privacy
interests. Without protection of this right to abortion, women could suffer
severe physical and psychological harm.6 2
55.
56.
57.

Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 544,549-52.

58.

See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.

59.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

60. Id. at 152-53 ("[O]nly personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,' are included in this guarantee of personal privacy .... This right of
privacy .. . [is] founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions
upon state action ... .) (citation omitted).

61.

Id. at 153.

62.

Id. ("The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this

choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy
may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and

future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care.
There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the

problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for
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Second, by applying the liberal approach, the Supreme Court posits
that reasoned judgment must be applied in determining what personal
interests of utmost value to individuals could amount to unenumerated
fundamental rights.63 This reasoned judgment standard can be traced back
to Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman,' where he stated
that the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause "recognizes, what a
reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require
particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their
abridgment." 65 Later in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey," the Supreme Court spelled out how reasoned
judgment should be applied to determine whether an unenumerated right
could be recognized as a liberty that merits due process protection.6 7 This
interpretive process, as the Court pointed out, is intended to "define the
liberty of all" rather than enforce the judges' "moral code." 6 8 Guided by
this caveat, the Court explicated its reasoning in defining the
nature of the liberty that triggers fundamental rights protection:
[Matters] involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State. 69
Following this choice-oriented conception of liberty, the Court
considered various reasons why prohibition of abortion severely harmed
women's dignity and autonomy in controlling and enjoying their lives. 70
it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood
may be involved. All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will
consider in consultation.").
63. See infra notes 64-96 and accompanying text.

64. 367U.S.497(1961).
65. Id. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 769
(1997) (Souter, J., concurring) ("The Poe dissent ...
[is] by reasoned judgment.").

66.

reminds us that the process of substantive review

505 U.S. 833 (1992).

67. Id. at 834 ("[T]he adjudication of substantive due process claims may require this Court to
exercise its reasoned judgment in determining the boundaries between the individual's liberty and the

demands of organized society.").
68. Id. at 850 ("Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral
code.").
69. Id.at851.
70. Id. at 852 ("The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical
constraints, to pain that only she must bear. That these sacrifices have from the beginning of the
human race been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to
the infant a bond of love cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

456

[Vol. 48:445

Given that decisions on abortion are so fundamental to women's interests,
abortion must be protected as a fundamental right allowing women to
choose the personal and social life that they wish to live.71
Later in Lawrence v. Texas,7 the Supreme Court also applied the
reasoned judgment standard to justify homosexuals' fundamental right to
consensual sodomy. 7 3 Liberty, according to the Court, protects personal
freedom in two dimensions. 7 4 Physically, it shields the boundaries of
private spaces, preventing unwarranted interferences by the government.7 5
Mentally, it affords individuals the autonomy to choose what they wish to
do.76 Relying upon Casey's choice-oriented characterization of liberty,1
the Court invalidated the anti-sodomy law of Texas on the ground that it
prevented homosexuals from enjoying the same autonomy to engage in
intimate acts as heterosexuals.7
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this jurisprudence on the
recognition of fundamental rights when it tackled same-sex marriage.7 9 In
Obergefell v. Hodges,so the Court took pains to identify the right to
marriage as of fundamental importance to all, stating that "[c]hoices about
marriage shape an individual's destiny.... [B]ecause 'it fulfils yearnings
for security, safe haven, and connection that express our common
humanity, civil marriage is an esteemed institution, and the decision
whether and whom to marry is among life's momentous acts
ofself-definition.'"81

Third, the Supreme Court has also reinforced the justification for the
constitutional protection of unenumerated fundamental rights on the basis
of societal interests. If a constitutional right is central to achieving larger
suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the
woman's role, however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and our culture.").

71. Id. ("The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of
her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.").
72. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
73. Id. at 564-65, 574,578-79.
74.

See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.

75. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567,578.
76. Id. at 562 ("Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a
dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there
are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a
dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self
that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case
involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.").
77. Id. at 573-74.
78. Id. at 574 ("Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes,
just as heterosexual persons do. The decision in Bowers would deny them this right.").
79. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
80. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
81. Id. at 2599 (quoting Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 NE.2d 941, 955
(Mass. 2003)).
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interests in maintaining a free and ordered society, it could be recognized
as a fundamental right. According to Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion
in Poe v. Ullman,8 2 the identification and protection of fundamental rights
through the Due Process Clause must be weighed with "the demands of
organized society." 8 3 He indicated that fundamental rights should be
rooted in societal interests, without which those rights would hallow in
symbolic and practical value.84 Similarly, the majority opinion in
Obergefell v. Hodges 5 treats societal interest as another justification for
marriage as a fundamental right. Citing Tocqueville's view 86 and the
Supreme Court's Maynard v. Hill8 7 ruling, the Court in Obergefell states

that "marriage is a keystone of our social order."8 8 It further discusses
ways in which marriage as a public institution plays a fundamental role in
maintaining the legal and social order by allocating benefits and
responsibilities to married couples.89 Relying on the social justification
posited by Obergefell, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon
recently rendered a pathbreaking decision on environmental protection.9
The Court identified "the right to a climate system capable of sustaining
human life" as a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause because
of this right's fundamental role in maintaining a free and ordered society. 9 1
With these three interpretive methods, the liberal approach defies the
originalist approach. The latter asserts that any fundamental right must be
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," 92 rendering the
meaning of "liberty" fixed and static under the Due Process Clause. On
82. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
83. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The best that can be said is that through the
course of this Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates
of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of
organized society.").
84. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
85. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
86. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct., at 2601 ("[WJhen the American retires from the turmoil of public
life to the bosom of his family, he finds in it the image of order and of peace... . [H]e afterwards
carries [that image] with him into public affairs.") (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVLLE, 1 DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 304 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry Reeve transl., Vintage Books ed. 1990) (1945)).
87. 125 U.S. 190, 211, 213 (1888) (holding that marriage is "the foundation of the family and
of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress" and also stating that
marriage is "a great public institution, giving character to our whole civil polity").
88. Obergefell,135S.Ct.at2601.
89. Id. ("[J]ust as a couple vows to support each other, so does society pledge to support the
couple, offering symbolic recognition and material benefits to protect and nourish the union.... The
States have contributed to the fundamental character of the marriage right by placing that institution
at the center of so many facets of the legal and social order.").
90. See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016).
91. Id.
92. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997) (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (plurality opinion)).
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the basis of this approach, protection of abortion as an unenumerated
fundamental right for women was rejected9 3 as was homosexuals' right to
privately engage in consensual sodomy. 94
The liberal approach has removed these legal stigmas from abortion
and consensual sodomy. Compared with the originalist approach, it has
proven better at promoting personal and public freedoms through its
robust interpretation of the scope of liberty protected as a fundamental
right under the Due Process Clause. Such a robust interpretation is a
crucial step towards conception of the Constitution as a supreme and
dynamic law capable of adapting itself in response to new necessities in
the US. 95 As Justice Frankfurter has observed of the Constitution, "[g]reat
concepts like . . . 'liberty' . . . were purposely left to gather meaning from

experience. For they relate to the whole domain of social and economic
fact, and the statesmen who founded this Nation knew too well that only
a stagnant society remains unchanged."9 6
III.

RECOGNIZING THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO TECHNOLOGY

In this Part, I apply the liberal approach to a consideration of why the
right to technology could fall within the scope of liberty under the Due
Process Clause and thereby be recognized as a fundamental right. To do
so, I demonstrate that technology is of fundamental importance to all
individuals in contemporary societies. I further argue that this new right
ought to protect two kinds of collective interests in technological
benefits-societal interests and group interests.

93. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) ("The fact that a majority of the States reflecting,
after all the majority sentiment in those States, have had restrictions on abortions for at least a century
is a strong indication, it seems to me, that the asserted right to an abortion is not 'so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."') (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)

(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
94. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,192-94 (1986) (refusing to "extend a fundamental right
to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy" because "[p]roscriptions against sodomy
have 'ancient roots"' and concluding that "to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best,
facetious").
95. See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 1("A 'living constitution' is one
that evolves, changes over time, and adapts to new circumstances, without being formally amended.")

(2010).
96. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
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FundamentalImportance of Technology

1. Technology and Personal Well-Being
In contemporary societies, technology plays an essential role in
maintaining the quality of individuals' material lives. Advances in
medical technology have led to lower infant mortality rates, cures for
diseases, and many more improvements in the physical well-being of all.97
More and more household and personal home healthcare apparatuses are
being rolled out in the market, resulting in a reduction in repeat admissions
to hospitals.98 Similarly, advances in biological technology have improved
the quantity and quality of food.9 9 The most striking example is the
introduction of genetically modified products. 0 0 Genetic modification
technology can be harnessed to produce more food with higher nutritional
value at a lower cost.0 o The invention of environmentally friendly
technologies has equipped us with tools to better protect water, air, and
land essential to our survival. 0 2 Various renewable energy generating
devices, such as solar roof tiles, Smartflower solar panels, and wind
turbines, have been developed to provide forms of energy alternative to
traditional fossil fuels and combat climate change. 103 Biodegradable
materials capable of consumption by marine organisms have been
invented and applied to products, such as straws and six-pack rings, to

97. See, e.g., David Weatherall et al., Science and Technology for Disease Control: Past,
Present, and Future, in DISEASE CONTROL PRIORITIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 119, 120-21
(Dean T. Jamison et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006) (discussing the role of medical technology in disease
control); Eva Alberman, Why Are Stillbirth and Neonatal Mortality Rates Continuing to Fall?, 92
BRIT. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 559, 563 (1985) (discussing fall of stillbirth and neonatal
mortality rates).
98. Mayank Pratap, How Is Technology Transforming Healthcare at Home, HACKER NOON
(Jan.4, 2019), https://hackemoon.com/how-is-technology-transforming-healthcare-at-home-1ce827
b355b9.
99. See, e.g., Malik G. Mustafa et al., Techniques in Biotechnology: Essentialfor Industry, in
2 OMICS TECHNOLOGIES AND BIo-ENGINEERING: TOWARDS IMPROVING QUALITY OF LIFE 233, 24546 (Debmalya Barh & Vasco Azevedo eds.,2018) (discussing food processing biotechnology); Rajat
P. Singh et al., Biotechnological Tools to Enhance SustainableProduction,in BIOTECHNOLOGY FOR
SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE: EMERGING APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES 19, 20-21 (Ram Lakhan
Singh & Sukanta Mondal eds., 2018) (discussing food production biotechnology); Arslan Butt, What
26, 2016),
Is Green Technology and Its Benefits?, U.S. GREEN TECH. (July
https://usgreentechnology.com/green-technology.
100. Meera Kaur, Genetically Modified Products, in GREEN ISSUES AND DEBATES: AN A-To-Z
GUIDE 249, 249-51, 254 (Howard S. Schiffman & Paul Robbins eds., 2011).
101. Frequently Asked Questions on Genetically Modified Foods, WHO (May 2014),
https://www.who.int/foodsafety/areas-work/food-technology/faq-genetically-modified-fooden.
102. Butt, supra note 99.
103. Gertie Goddard, Exciting New Green Technology of the Future, SCI.Focus (Aug. 1, 2017),
https://www.sciencefocus.com/future-technology/exciting-new-green-technology-of-the-future.
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alleviate water pollution. 10 4 The rapid development of AI has brought
convenience to daily life. It has empowered digital devices like
smartphones and smart speakers with voice assistants, capable of
performing a variety of tasks, including playing music, composing
0
messages, answering questions, and turning lights on and off. o Selfdriving cars can not only save fuel and reduce accident rates, but they also
permit drivers and passengers to spend their time on productive activities
during their journeys.106
Moreover, technology plays an essential role in promoting the
07
In contemporary societies, new
quality of mental and spiritual life.o
technologies have made it vastly easier for people to locate and obtain
information on various aspects of their lives, thereby helping them to
make better-informed decisions.10 Undoubtedly, the availability of
adequate information is necessary for decision-making about issues of
long-term impact.
Advances in information technology have fueled the invention of
both hardware and software capable of producing and disseminating
information faster than ever before. The invention of satellites, computers,
and fiber-optic cables, for example, has led to unprecedented
improvements in the scope of communicative activities.109 The
contemporary global telecommunications network relies on seamlessly
integrated fiber-optic cables,' 10 which enable rapid transmission of high
volumes of data, audio, voice, and video to an extent that no other
technologies, including copper cables, microwaves, and satellites, can
offer."' In 2018, the worldwide average download speed on fixed
broadband increased by nearly twenty-seven percent from the previous
year to 46.12 Mbps, making it 800 times faster than dial-up.1 2 The number
104. Id.
105. Voice Assistants: How Artificial Intelligence Assistants Are Changing Our Lives Every
Day, SMARTSHEET, https://www.smartsheet.com/voice-assistants-artificial-intelligence (last visited

Jan. 25, 2020).
106. Michelle L.D. Hanlon, Self-Driving Cars: Autonomous Technology That Needs a
DesignatedDuty Passenger,22 BARRY L. REV. 1, 3-6 (2016).

107. Gideon Kimbrell, How Artificial Intelligence Will Improve Our Spiritual Life, OBSERVER
(Jan. 9, 2017, 2:20 PM), https://observer.com/2017/01/is-there-space-for-ai-in-a-spiritual-world.
108. See, e.g., Hassan Mansoor, How Technology Advancement Is Delivering Value to
Customers in 2018, CUSTOMERTHINK (Aug. 8, 2018), http://customerthink.comhow-technology2
8
(stating that customers can get more
advancement-is-delivering-value-to-customers-in- 01
information to make more informed decisions).
109. Reading: Computer Network, LUMEN LEARNING, https://courses.lumenlearning.com/comp
uterapps/chapter/reading-computer-network (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
110. Barney Warf, Telecommunications and Geography, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GEOGRAPHY

2782, 2783,2784 fig.1, 2785 (Barney Warf ed., 2010).
111. See id.
112. See Differences Between Dial Up and High Speed Internet Connections, PLUG THINGS IN,
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of countries with gigabit fixed broadband networks is growing.113 Audio
and video streaming, in contrast with downloading, is made possible by
"advances in bandwidth availability, computer processing power and
digital compression techniques."ll4
Similarly, software developments have led to the creation of search
engines and social media. The Internet stores an unprecedented amount of
data and information. As of August 2019, there were more than 1.27
billion websites."1 Search engines play a pivotal role in finding
information among these websites by indexing webpages and enabling
Internet users to make search queries."' Social media is characterized by
a participatory culture, emphasizing user participation and interactive
communication. Users can take an active role in creating content and
freely share others' content. With an Internet connection, they can post
text, images, sound, video, or any combination thereof, to report events
instantly at the scene.
2. Technology and Societal Well-Being
From the societal standpoint, technology plays an increasingly vital
role in economic development. Technological progress creates new tools
and methods of production, thereby improving efficiency and
productivity.In doing so, it transforms a society's mode of production and
employment structure of a society may be disrupted rapidly as a result. In
the mid-eighteenth century, the Industrial Revolution transformed Britain
from a largely agrarian economy into an industrial economy. Textile,
metal, shipbuilding, and many other industries began to boom." 7 The
employment share and output of the agricultural sector declined while
those of the industry sector grew after the Industrial Revolution." Global
gross domestic product growth per person since 1750 has surged to 1.5%
http://www.plugthingsin.com/intemet/connection/dialup-vs-high-speed-intemet (last visited Jan. 25,
2020); Isla McKetta, The World's Internet in 2018: Faster,Modernizing and Always On, SPEEDTEST
(Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.speedtest.net/insights/blog/2018-internet-speeds-global.
113. McKetta, supra note 112.
114. Lokman Tsui, Streaming Media, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JOURNALISM 1345, 1345
(Christopher H. Sterling ed., 2009).
2019),
15,
(Aug.
NETCRAFT
Survey,
Server
Web
2019
115. August
https://news.netcraft.com/archives/2019/08/15/august-2019-web-server-survey.htm1.
116. Craig W. Walker, Application of the DMCA Safe HarborProvisions to Search Engines,
VA. J.L. & TECH., Winter 2004, at 1, 5.
117. Artemis Manolopoulou, The IndustrialRevolution and the ChangingFace of Britain, BRIT.
MUSEUM, https://www.britishmuseum.org/research/publications/online-researchscatalogues/
paper..money/paper..money-of-england wales/theindustrialrevolution.aspx (last visited Jan. 25,
2020).
118. N.F.R. Crafts, The IndustrialRevolution: Economic Growth in Britain, 1700-1860, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL

HISTORY 64, 70 tbl.7, 71 (Anne Digby & Charles Feinstein

eds., 1989).
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per year on average, as opposed to 0.01% per year for nearly 3000 years
up to 1750.H9
With the rise of the Internet and advances in information and
communications technology, e-commerce has transformed the traditional
way of doing business. Brick-and-mortar stores are no longer the only
choice available to businesses and consumers making everyday
purchases. Some retailers have had to move at least some portion of their
business from offline to online1 2 0 and close some stores in response to ecommerce pressure.121 Online retail sales are surging. In 2017, retail ecommerce accounted for 10.4% of all retail sales in the world, projected
to double to 22% in 2023.122
Technology also shapes cultural development. Technological
development and advancement change people's working styles and
lifestyles dramatically. The invention of machinery during the Industrial
Revolution drove people working in home cottages to factories. The
technology of automobility that powers cars, ferries, trains, and airplanes
shorten the time, space, and distance that travelers experience. It
facilitates long-distance travel to places previously inaccessible.
Automobility provided by the car "gave Americans an opportunity to
express their individualism and to have geographical freedom." 23 With
cars, people could live in suburban and rural areas to distance themselves
from each other and their workplaces. More and more consumer and
leisure activities were organized in association with cars including car
camping, staying in motels, watching movies in drive-in cinemas, and
buying food from drive-in restaurants. A new unique form of culture,
which is called car culture, has been formed among car owners.
One of the most influential impacts of technology on culture is
through the development of mass media. Since the invention of cameras
and projectors in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the
formation of major studios in the 1920s, such as MGM and Paramount,
the U.S. film industry has thrived.12 4 Guglielmo Marconi developed radio
119. How Has Growth Changed Over Time?, BANK OFENG., https://www.bankofengland.co.
uk/knowledgebank/how-has-growth-changed-over-time (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
120. See, e.g., Geoffrey Smith, H&M andZaraAre Closing Stores to Get Ahead, FORTUNE (Aug.
11, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/08/11/hm-zara-store-closing (reporting that H&M and Zara are
closing their physical stores and putting more resources into online sales).
121. Alistair Gray, US Retailers Shut up Shop as Amazon's March Continues, FIN.TIMES (Mar.

8, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/93c602a4-4155- 1e9-9bee-efab61506f44.
122. Andrew Lipsman, Global Ecommerce 2019, EMARKETER (Jan.

25,

2020),

https://www.emarketer.com/content/global-ecommerce-2019.
123. GARY CROSS & RICK SZOSTAK,TECHNOLOGY AND AMERICAN SOCIETY: A HISTORY 272

(2d ed. 2005).
124.

Patrick Trey Brady, The Celluloid Advocate: The Evolution of the Twentieth Century

Cinematic Lawyer, 27 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 165, 167 (2017).
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telegraphy for long-distance communication in 1896.125 The first public
radio broadcast was made in Canada in 1906,126 and the first U.S. radio
station, KDKA Pittsburgh, was set up in 1920.127 Radio arrived in Britain
with the British Broadcasting Corporation ("BBC") in 1922.128 Radio
flourished before the advent of television broadcasting, which was
developed in the 1930s with the interruption of World War I.129The BBC
began the first regularly scheduled television service in 1936.130 By 1954,
approximately fifty-five percent of American homes had television.' 3It
remains one of the most accessible mediums for disseminating
information and providing entertainment, though the impact of the
Internet on culture has increased massively since the development of the
World Wide Web and web browsers in the late 1980s and early 1990s.132
Mass media is an agent of socialization presenting common, more or
less standardized, views of culture and norms to the public. Upon entering
World War H, the U.S. government coordinated with the Hollywood film
industry to produce films with patriotic messages to boost the morale of
Americans at the home front.1 3 3 Through television and social media,
Korean entertainment and pop music have spread to other parts of the
world including Japan, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the U.S., giving
Korean culture global popularity in a phenomenon known as the
"Korean Wave." 34

125. Transmitting Electrical Signals, U.S. Patent No. 586,193 (filed Dec. 7, 1896) (issued July
13,1897).
126. James E. O'Neal, Dec. 21, 1906: A Very Significant Date in Radio, RADIOWORLD (Dec.
22, 2016), https://www.radioworld.com/columns-and-views/dec-21-1906-a-very-significant-date-inradio.
127. Jorge A. Camacho & Roger Manvell, Broadcasting, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (Aug.
10,2018),https://www.britannica.com/technology/broadcasting#ref270980.
128. History of the BBC - 1920s, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/timelines/zxqc4wx (last visited

Jan. 25, 2020).
129.

Camacho & Manvell, supra note 127.

130. History of the BBC - 1930s, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/timelines/zqbfyrd (last visited
Aug. 14,2019).
MUSEUM,
HIST.
BUFFALO
America,
in
Households
TV
of
131. Number
http://www.buffalohistory.org/explore/exhibits/virtual-exhibits/wheelsfoLpower/educmaterials/te

levision.handout.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2019).
132. See Graham T.T. Molitor, Communication Technologies That Will Change Our Lives, USA
TODAY, Jan. 2003, at 60, 64.
133. See Philip M. Taylor, Propaganda in World War II, in THE INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMMUNICATION 3925, 3927-28 (Wolfgang Donsbach ed., 2008); Robert Sklar
& David A. Cook, History of the Motion Picture, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (Jan. 25, 2020),
https://www.britannica.com/art/history-of-the-motion-picture.
134. Yeojin Kim, A Possibility of the Korean Wave Renaissance ConstructionThrough K-Pop:
Sustainable Development of the Korean Wave as a Cultural Industry, 36 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.

LJ. 59,62-70, 75-76, 79 (2013).
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3. Summary
The liberal approach shows that "liberty" as protected by the Due
Process Clause is a dynamic concept. It is able to encompass new
fundamental rights, provided that their intrinsic worth in terms of ensuring
basic individual freedoms and promoting social interests has been
established through reasoned judgment. As I have demonstrated in the
above discussion, technology is of intrinsic worth in both respects.
Therefore, it is time to consider whether the right to technology should be
recognized as a new fundamental right under the Due Process Clause. The
potential expansion of fundamental rights protection to technology is
echoed by a recent survey asking Americans what has contributed to the
greatest improvement in their lives in the past five decades.'35
Respondents afforded technology greater credit than either the expansion
of civil rights or economic improvement' 3 6 and also predicted that
technology would be the most important force for improvements in their
lives over the next five decadesm Another recent survey shows that more
than an absolute majority of Americans believe technology has made their
overall life better and expect technology to continue improving the quality
of life of their children. 138
B.

ProtectingCollective Interests

What is the nature and scope of the fundamental right to technology?
In this Subpart, I argue that the new fundamental right to technology ought
to protect two kinds of collective interests in the benefits of technological
progress, namely societal interests and group interests. In this way, the
fundamental right to technology gives rise to distributive justice agendas
for achieving substantive equality in the sharing of such benefits as well
as preventing technology from harming the common good.
135. Mark Strauss, Four-in-Ten Americans Credit Technology with Improving Life Most in the
12, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/factPast 50 Years, PEw RES. CTR. (Oct.
tank/2017/10/12/four-in-ten-americans-credit-technology-with-improving-life-most-in-the-past-50years.
136. Id. ("In an open-ended question, respondents were asked, 'What would you say was the
biggest improvement to life in America over the past 50 years or so?' Technology was cited most
(42%), while far fewer respondents mentioned medicine and health (14%), civil and equal rights
(10%) or other advancements. Technology was identified as the biggest improvement by whites
(47%) and Hispanics (35%), while blacks were about as likely to name technology (26%) as they
were civil and equal rights (21%).").
137. Id. ("Another open-ended question in the same 2017 survey asked Americans to predict the
biggest improvements to life over the next 50 years. The top responses were expected improvements
from technology (22%) or from medicine and health (20%).").
138. Press Release, Ipsos, GET Creative/USA Today Network, Charles Koch InstituteTechnology Survey (Mar. 1, 2019),https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/20

1903/technology-press-release.pdf.
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1. Societal Interests in Technological Benefits
The fundamental right to technology protects societal interests in
technological benefits in two ways. It serves societal interests in enjoying
the benefits accrued from the progress of fundamental technologies. In
practice, it entitles everyone to enjoy the benefits of the technologies that
are fundamental to the sustainability of their lives and freedoms. Such
fundamental technologies may include electricity, transportation,
telephones, and the Internet, to name a few, 139 and set a minimum core for
the technology sector. However, they do not include derivative
technologies that embody improvements to the fundamental technologies
and offer extra benefits. For instance, a local government should provide
public transportation services to protect residents' right to enjoy the
benefits of transportation technology. However, the government by no
means needs to procure Mercedes Benz buses for public transportation,
nor attempt to allocate public funds to distribute a car to every resident.
The benefits conferred by the Internet are the epitome of collective
interests in the benefits accrued from the progress of fundamental
technologies. In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,'140 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the Internet as a whole had served as a "vast
democratic forum[]."41The Court further explained how the Internet had
begun to play a vital role in promoting societal interests in political
communications:
[The Internet] provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for
communication of all kinds.... Th[e] dynamic, multifaceted category
of communication includes not only traditional print and news services,
but also audio, video, and still images, as well as interactive, real-time
dialogue. Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line
can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could
from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and
newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer.14 2
Based on this explication of the public benefits of the early-stage
Internet, the Supreme Court in Packingham v. North Carolina'4 3
considered the societal interests generated by the contemporary

139. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Patents and Human Rights: The ParadoxRe-Examined, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO SCIENCE AND CULTURE: CONVERGENCE OR CONFLICT?

65, 65 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2016) (arguing that the right to technology "extends only to basic
technologies, such as medicines, transportation, telephones, and computers-as opposed to Ferraris,
smartphones, high-definition televisions, Roombas or Fitbits").
140. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
141. Id.at851,868.
142. Id. at 870.
143. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
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Internet." First, the Court suggested that the Internet is as important as
public streets and parks, the traditional public forums that merit the full
spectrum of free speech protection. 14 5 Second, it demonstrated that social
media outlets, the most dynamic new additions to the Internet, have
become vehicles for socially beneficial communicative activities:
Social media offers "relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for
communication of all kinds." On Facebook, for example, users can
debate religion and politics with their friends and neighbors or share
vacation photos. On Linkedn, users can look for work, advertise for
employees, or review tips on entrepreneurship. And on Twitter, users
can petition their elected representatives and otherwise engage with
them in a direct manner. Indeed, Governors in all 50 States and almost
every Member of Congress have set up accounts for this purpose. In
short, social media users employ these websites to engage in a wide
array of protected First Amendment activity on topics "as diverse as
human thought."l 46
In this passage, the Supreme Court shows that the new social media
technologies have significantly increased the power of the Internet to
produce a collective interest in the public exchange of information and
knowledge.' 4 7 Not only have these social media technologies engaged
many more people in communicative activities, but they also offer a more
dynamic means of creating and sharing information. This, in turn, is
conducive to the economic, cultural, and political development of the
United States.
While the U.S. Supreme Court has considered the social functions of
the Internet as a whole, the lower courts have examined how specific
technological ingredients of the Internet can serve societal interests.1 48 In
Field v. Google Inc.,'4 9 Google had used an automated web crawler to
cache Field's personal website containing his copyrighted works and
displayed the cached content of that website when users clicked on cached
links in Google search results.150 The District Court of Nevada held that
Google's provision of cached links constituted fair use largely on the
grounds that such links "serve[] different and socially important purposes
144. See id. at 1735-36.
145. Id. at 1735 ("While in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the most
important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It is
cyberspace-the 'vast democratic forums of the Internet' in general, and social media in particular.")
(citation omitted) (citing Reno, 521 U.S. at 868).
146. Id. at 1735-36 (citations omitted) (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 870).
147. See id.
148. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735-36; see infra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
149. 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
150. Id. at 1110-14.
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in offering access to copyrighted works. .. ."I In Kelly v. Arriba Soft
Corp.15 2 and Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 15 3 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that the reproduction in their entirety of numerous
photographs or web pages to create and operate Internet search engines
constitutes fair use. 1 54 The court held that because such reproductions are
created by search engines in their capacity as an electronic reference tool,
they benefit society as a whole by improving public access
to information."'
The fundamental right to technology also protects societal interests
in preventing seriously harmful uses of all technologies, both fundamental
and derivative. Therefore, it prohibits people from utilizing any
technology that may cause serious harm to societal interests in
maintaining a democratic political system, improving environmental
protection, enhancing innovation capacity, and securing food security,
among other interests. For example, when a government utilizes digital
technologies to unduly filter the Internet, it prevents citizens from gaining
access to the information on filtered websites, thereby defeating the
purposes of the Internet as identified in the above judicial rulings.
Ultimately, such pervasive filtering jeopardizes the collective interest in
the Internet's use as a vehicle for maintaining an open and
democratic society.156
2. Group Interests in Technological Benefits
The fundamental right to technology also protects group interests in
enjoying the benefits accrued from the progress of fundamental
technologies and preventing seriously harmful uses of all technologies on

151. Id. at 1119. The Court summarized its fair use ruling as follows:
[Tihe first fair use factor weighs heavily in Google's favor because its "Cached" links are
highly transformative. The second fair use factor weighs only slightly against fair use
because Field made his works available in their entirety for free to the widest possible
audience. The third fair use factor is neutral, as Google used no more of the copyrighted
works than was necessary to serve its transformative purposes. The fourth fair use factor
cuts strongly in favor of fair use in the absence of any evidence of an impact on a potential
market for Field's copyrighted works. A fifth factor, a comparison of the equities, likewise
favors fair use. A balance of all of these factors demonstrates that if Google copies or
distributes Field's copyrighted works by allowing access to them through "Cached" links,
Google's conduct is fair use of those works as a matter of law.
Id. at 1123.
152. 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
153. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
154. Perfect 10,508 F.3d at 1166-68; Kelly, 336 F.3dat 815, 818-22.
155. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165 (ruling that "a search engine provides social benefit by
incorporating an original work into a new work, namely, an electronic reference tool").
156.

See JONATHAN ZIrRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND How TO STOP IT 9,117-18

(2008).
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the basis of the shared identity of the group members taking advantage of
technological benefits to pursue various social and cultural activities.11
Examples of groups whose collective interests merit legal protection
include educators, journalists, researchers, and students. The importance
of protecting group-based interests in technological benefits can be
inferred from a number of judicial rulings. In Sega Enterprises Ltd. v.
Accolade, Inc.,' 5 8 for example, the Ninth Circuit Court applied the fair use
doctrine to protect the public interest in reverse engineering technology
that allows software engineers as a group of users to achieve
interoperability of different software programs.1 59 In Righthaven LLC v.
Realty One Group, Inc.,1 fair use was invoked by the Nevada District
Court to protect the interests of bloggers as a group of users in copying
limited amounts of copyrighted work to create blog posts on
the Internet.''
Meanwhile, new technological developments could result in serious
harm to group-based interests. This would trigger the invocation of the
group right to technology to prevent or eliminate harm to a certain group
of people. For example, the use of algorithms in facial recognition
technology has been found to introduce systematic bias in classifying
race-based information.1 6 2 Google Photos has misclassified black people
as gorillas, 1 63 and Amazon's Rekognition falsely identified many
157.

See GEORGE W. RAINBOLT, THE CONCEPT OF RIGHTS205-07 (2006) ("Many group rights

seem to be rights to participatory goods."); Denise R6aume, Individuals,Groups, and Rights to Public
Goods, 38 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 1 (1988) ("[A]ny rights to participatory goods must be held by groups
rather than individuals.").

158.
159.

977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1523 (ruling that reverse engineering "has led to an increase in the number of

independently designed video game programs offered for use with the [plaintiff's] console"); see also
Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering,111

YALE LJ. 1575, 1608-4)9 (2002) ("From this approximation of source code, reverse engineers can
discern or deduce internal design details of the program, such as information necessary to develop a
program that will interoperate with the decompiled or disassembled program.").

160. No. 2:10-cv-1036-LRH-PAL, 2010 WL4115413 (D. Nev. Oct. 19,2010).
161. Id.at*1,*3.
162. Ali Breland, How White Engineers Built Racist Code -and Why It's Dangerousfor Black
People, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 4,2017,4:00 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/de
c/04/racist-facial-recognition-white-coders-black-people-police ("Experts such as Joy Buolamwini, a
researcher at the MIT Media Lab, think that facial recognition software has problems recognizing
black faces because its algorithms are usually written by white engineers who dominate the
technology sector. These engineers build on pre-existing code libraries, typically written by other
white engineers.").
163. Tom Simonite, When It Comes to Gorillas, Google PhotosRemains Blind,WRED (Jan. 11,
2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/when-it-comes-to-gorillas-google-photos-remainsblind; Maggie Zhang, Google Photos Tags Two African-Americans as Gorillas Through Facial
Recognition Software, FORBES (July 1, 2015, 1:42 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mzhang/2015

/07/01/google-photos-tags-two-african-americans-as-gorillas-through-facial-recognitionsoftware/#b22c542713d8.
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Congressmen of color as crime suspects. 164A recent study found that the
problems with facial recognition technology are even more alarming than
those isolated cases suggest. It reported that "Asian and African American
people were up to 100 times more likely to be misidentified than white
men, . . . [and] Native Americans had the highest false-positive rate of all
ethnicities." 6 Without swift action to correct its algorithms, facial
recognition technology could profoundly deteriorate group-based
interests in racial equality.
3. Summary
Legally, the fundamental right to technology, as shown above,
affords two dimensions of legal protection. It protects the public's fair
share of the technological benefits that are key to fulfilment of the overall
economic, political, and cultural needs of a society or a group to which
that public belongs. At the same time, it disallows the uses of technology
that would seriously imperil societal and group interests.
Ethically, the fundamental right to technology would induce public
discourse about how to achieve equitable distribution of technological
benefits and proactive prevention of seriously harmful uses of
technologies. Further, the intensification of such discourse would further
bring these issues to the forefront of the decision-making process operated
by the relevant administrative and legislative agencies.

IV.

PROTECTING THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO TECHNOLOGY
THROUGH IP LAW

This Part explores the legal and policy implications of the
fundamental right to technology. I argue that this right could play an

164.

Sasha Ingber, Facial Recognition Software Wrongly Identifies 28 Lawmakers as Crime

Suspects, NPR (July 26, 2018, 6:42 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/26/632724239/facialNatasha
Singer,
recognition-software-wrongly-identifies-28-lawmakers-as-crime-suspects;
Amazon's FacialRecognition Wrongly Identifies 28 Lawmakers, A.CL.U. Says, N.Y TIMES (July 26,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/technology/amazon-aclu-facial-recognition-congress.h
tml; Jacob Snow, Amazon's Face Recognition Falsely Matched 28 Members of Congress with

Mugshots, ACLU (July 26, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveilla
nce-technologies/amazons-face-recognition-falsely-matched-28.
165. Drew Harwell, FederalStudy Confirms Racial Bias ofMany Facial-RecognitionSystems,
Casts Doubt on Their Expanding Use, WASH.POST (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.co
m/technology/2019/12/19/federal-study-confirms-racial-bias-many-facial-recognition-systemscasts-doubt-their-expanding-use.
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important role in mediating the relationship between IP law and equitable
distribution of technological benefits. 166
A.

Limiting the IP Clause

The IP Clause of the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."167 It defines the objective of the legislative
power of Congress and prescribes means to achieve the objective. First,
the wording of the Clause shows that it is intended to promote
technological progress and knowledge growth.1 68 It is commonly
understood that "Science" is not confined to scientific inquiry but
encompasses all knowledge, and "useful Arts" does not refer to artistic
endeavors, but rather to fields related to technology or
technological arts.169
Second, the IP Clause capitalizes on legal protection of copyrights
and patents as the means to promote technological progress and
knowledge growth. Under the Clause, Congress's enactment of copyright
and patent laws functions to financially incentivize authors and inventors
to create new works and inventions and further make them available to
the public in the marketplace. While authors and inventors receive
monetary rewards for doing so, the public benefits from new knowledge
solutions presented
embodied in works and technological
by inventions. 170

Utilitarianism-based policy analysis undergirds the IP Clause. IP
rights protection serves as an aspect of the government's economic policy
through optimizing technological progress and knowledge growth. The
166. See infra Part IV.
167. U.S. CONT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
168.

See Barton Beebe, Bleistein, The Problem of Aesthetic Progress, and the Making of

American Copyright Law, 117 CoLUM. L. REV. 319, 341 (2017) (arguing that "the late eighteenth
century, the realms of'Science and useful Arts' had developed well-accepted, positive, and seemingly
objective standards of judgment, standards that Congress and courts could rely on to limit the reach

of monopoly rights to those 'Writings' and 'Discoveries' the creation of which did indeed promote
scientific and technological progress").

169.

See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 634 (2010) (ruling that "the term 'useful arts' was

widely understood to encompass the fields that we would now describe as relating to technology or
'technological arts"').

170.

See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) ("The

monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to
provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public
purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by

the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after
the limited period of exclusive control has expired.").
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more new inventions and works, the better the promotion of technological
progress and knowledge growth. Central to the realization of this policy
goal is to incentivize increased creation of inventions and works. As the
Supreme Court has elaborated:
The patent laws promote [technological] progress by offering a right of
exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk the
often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development. The
productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society
through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture
into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment
and better lives for our citizens. In return for the right of exclusion-this
'reward for inventions,'-the patent laws impose upon the inventor a
requirement of disclosure.171

The Court has also used the same utilitarian logic to justify copyright
protection. 172 These opinions show that the "incentive" thesis and costand-benefit analysis are two major components of the utilitarian theory.
First, IP protection promotes technological progress for society because it
provides the requisite incentives to create new inventions and works.
While the initial process of creation can be arduous and costly, copying is
easy and cheap. This stark contrast makes it likely that copiers can easily
free-ride on creators' efforts. Gradually or even overnight, creators may
lose their competitiveness in the marketplace if copyists can distribute
cheaper copies. This vulnerability to free-riding activities may deter riskaverse creators from investing in innovation and creativity. IP protection,
by contrast, gives creators a set of exclusive rights to use their creations,
and copiers would be penalized if they use copyrighted materials without
IP rights owners' consent.1 7 Hence, IP protection provides the incentive
in the form of assurance to creators that their efforts will be protected
against unauthorized uses and that they can recoup their investments
through commercial exploitation of their creations.174

171.
172.

Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,480 (1974).
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,429 (1984).
173. However, copiers would not be penalized if unauthorized uses of IP fall within the scope of
limitations on IP rights. For example, fair use as a limitation on copyright allows the public to make
limited uses of copyrighted works without their owners' consent.
174.

See e.g., WLLIAM M. LANDES & RIcHARD A. PosNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
40 (2003) ("In the absence of copyright protection the market price
of a book or other expressive work will eventually be bid down to the marginal cost of copying, with
the result that the work may not be produced in the first place because the author and publisher may
not be able to recover their costs of creating it."); Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction
to the Law and Economics ofIntellectual Property,J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES,Winter 1991, at 5 (stating
that producers will innovate only if they receive an appropriate return).
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Second, utilitarianism applies the cost-and-benefit analysis to make
sure that the benefits of technological progress accrued from IP protection
far exceed the costs in maintaining such a legal system. By focusing on
the "access versus incentive" tradeoff, 17 the cost-and-benefit analysis
requires a close scrutiny of the costs that IP protection may incur and then
caps them way below the benefits it may generate.7 6 This analysis
normally leads to the assertion that "the more extensive copyright
protection is, the greater the incentive to create intellectual property."l77
However, a major problem with utilitarianism lies in its mishandling
of distributive justice. While it dictates the maximization of utilities of a
policy for its social outcome as a whole, it fails to take into account the
fair distribution of utilities among members of a society. It normally
abstracts and considers wealth as a utility, and then it does not make a
difference if one individual enjoys many more utilities than most others.
This is because the general sum of all the utilities is still maximized. With
regard to a social policy, it results in a larger number of utilities, say a
one-billion-dollar growth in wealth, for the rich, but a smaller number of
loss of utilities, say one-million-dollar wealth, for the poor. This policy,
albeit damaging to the poor, could still pass utilitarianism's scrutiny
because all that matters is maximizing the sum of utilities, regardless of
the existence of profound injustice. John Rawls criticized utilitarianism
for causing injustice as follows:
[T]here is no reason in principle why the greater gains of some should
not compensate for the lesser losses of others; or more importantly, why
the violation of the liberty of a few might not be made right by the
greater good shared by many.... No doubt the strictness of common
sense precepts of justice has a certain usefulness in limiting men's
propensities to injustice and to socially injurious actions, but the
utilitarian believes that to affirm this strictness as a first principle of
morals is a mistake."'
This criticism also applies to the IP Clause, which fails to tackle the
relationship between social justice and technological progress properly.
Based upon utilitarianism, the Clause is silent on how the benefits of
technological progress should be equitably distributed among the
members of the public. A proper IP protection system undoubtedly
facilitates the constitutional objective of promoting technological
175. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 174, at 20.
176. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright'sIncentives-Access Paradigm,49 VAND.L.
REv. 483, 499-554 (1996) (exploring the premises of the "incentive/access paradigm").
177. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. Cm. L.
REv. 471,474 (2003).
178.

JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 23 (rev. ed. 1999).
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progress.179But there are indeed a host of policy concerns about how the
benefits accrued from technological progress as promoted by new
inventions and works should be distributed among the public who are nonIP owners. Should IP rights owners primarily control the distribution of
technological benefits through voluntary transactions and would this
arrangement bring about injustices in access to such benefits? If so, what
is the role of the government in channeling the equitable distribution of
technological benefits in the marketplace? Moreover, would unfair
distribution
of
technological
benefits
ultimately
deter
technological progress?
The principles of justice proposed by John Rawls reveal the roots of
the IP Clause's neglect of distributive justice. Rawls argued that injustices
can be only tolerated to the extent that the difference principle and equal
opportunity principle are met. The equal opportunity principle dictates
that "offices and positions [are] open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity."' By applying legal standards equally to
everyone who may become authors and inventors with legal protections
for their works or inventions, copyright and patent laws that emanate from
the IP Clause satisfy the equal opportunity principle.''
However, the IP Clause runs counter to the difference principle,
which requires that certain injustices caused by an institution be excused
on the condition that the institution distributes resources to "the greatest
benefit of the least advantaged."' 82 This principle is intended to achieve
distributive justice in "property-own democracy."' 8 As noted above, built
upon utilitarianism, the IP Clause is only meant to maximize
technological progress through increased production of works and
inventions. But it does not deal with how the benefits accrued from
technological progress should be distributed among members of the
public. Hence it does not require distribution of such benefits to the least
advantaged according to the difference principle. The public, including
the least advantaged, ought to obtain IP rights owners' authorization
mostly through voluntary market transactions in order to enjoy the
technological benefits of inventions and works.84 Such a market-based
179. See Beebe, supra note 172, at 333, 337, 345.
180. RAWLS, supra note 178, at 266.
181. See Justin Hughes & Robert P. Merges, Copyright and Distributive Justice, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 513, 552 (2017) (arguing that the U.S. copyright system is in line with the equal
opportunity principle).
182. RAWLS, supra note 178, at 266.Rawls further explains that "[t]he intuitive idea is that the
social order is not to establish and secure the more attractive prospects of those better off unless doing
so is to the advantage of those less fortunate." Id. at 65.
183. Id. at 67.
184.

See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTAL PROPERTY 5 (2011) (contending that
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rights protection system may encourage increased production of
inventions and works as the IP Clause intends, and further privilege those
who are financially able to afford those products to benefit from the
relevant technological progress.115 The IP Clause does not mandate any
distributive justice measures to make those who are the least
disadvantaged financially, politically and culturally to gain necessary
benefits from inventions and works before their IP protection expires.
In Golan v. Holder,18 6 the constitutionality of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act ("URAA") was challenged because this statute
automatically restored copyright protection to all works of foreign origin
that were not yet in the public domain in their source countries, but that
were in the public domain in the United States for specified reasons. That
restoration of copyright protection actually "carries distributive
1 7
consequences that have disadvantaged certain groups of content users."
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer criticized the URAA's copyright
restoration from the distributive justice perspective, stating that "[ilf a
school orchestra or other nonprofit organization cannot afford the new
charges [caused by copyright restoration] ...

[t]hey will have to do

without."' Thus, he accused the URAA's copyright restoration of
"aggravat[ing] the already serious problem of cultural education in the
United States."189

The fundamental right to technology would serve as a check on
Congress's legislative power granted by the IP Clause. It would require
that Congress scrutinize distributive justice when legislative proposals to
expand IP rights are put on agenda. Thereby, legislators would have to
vigilantly examine the extent to which a proposed expansion of rights
protection would allow the public, particularly the various groups of the
least advantaged, to enjoy the technological benefits accrued from the
subsequently stronger IP rights protection. Moreover, legislators would
"the most important core principle" of property rights over intangible assets such as copyright is this:
"[I]t assigns to individual people control over individual assets. It creates a one-to-one mapping
between owners and assets."); Christopher Kalanje, Leveraging Intellectual Property: Beyond the
'Right to Exclude', WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/leveraging-ip-fulltext.html (last
visited Jan. 25, 2020) (arguing that the value of IP rights in business stems from the strategic use of
the right to exclude).
185. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND

18 (2008) ("Copyright law is supposed to give us a self-regulating cultural policy in which the right
to exclude others from one's original expression fuels a vibrant public sphere indirectly driven by

popular demand."); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83TEx.L.REV.
1535, 1537 (2005) ("Copyright law generally addresses the relationship between creative expression
and money in terms of maximizing total creativity.").

186.
187.
188.
189.

565 U.S. 302 (2012).
Haochen Sun, Copyrightand Responsibility,4 HARv. J. SPORTS& ENT. L. 263,297 (2013).
Golan, 565 U.S. at 354 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
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be required to proactively consider ways in which limitations should be
placed on IP rights so as to adequately protect the fundamental right
to technology.
B.

Shifting the Legislative Progressin the Public Interest

In order to serve as a check on IP legislative power with distributive
justice mandates, the fundamental right to technology would further
require fixing the "tyranny of the majority"" problem embedded in the
legislative process to be dealt with proactively in allocating the benefits
of technological progress. 191 This legislative process often suffers from
rent-seeking behavior that leads many legislators to vote in majority in the
interests of a particular commercial entity. This problem is endemic in
legislative progress pertaining to IP laws. Legislative expansions of
copyright protection, for example, are designed to serve the interests of
copyright-based industries.1 9 2In response to the challenges posed by
reproduction and communication technologies, lobbyists from those
industries have urged legislatures to strengthen copyright-protection.1 9 3
In this one-sided process, many legislators are preoccupied with a
rhetoric purporting that stronger copyright protection would give right
holders a stronger economic incentive to produce and disseminate works,
thereby resulting in a greater number of works being available to the
public. 1 9 4 Yet, only industry representatives engage in this rhetoric.
190.

See

LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY

OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL

FAIRNESS IN

REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 3 (1994).

191. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separationof Powers, 113 HARV.L. REV. 633,727 (2000)
(arguing that we must prevent majoritarian tyranny and make a democratically-elected legislature
"checked and balanced by a host of special-purpose branches, each motivated by one or more of the
three basic concerns of separationist theory"); David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions,
101 CAL.L. REV. 863,892 (2013) ("[T]he mere recitation of rights in a constitution does not translate
into actual respect for those rights in practice."); Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The
Positive Puzzle of ConstitutionalCommitment, 124 HAR.L. REV. 657,731 (2011) ("[Wle expect the
kinds of institutional arrangements that qualify as constitutional structure to display greater political
stability than the particularistic policy prohibitions represented by rights.").
192. See Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6 (2010) (providing an
example of a copyright-based industry halting copyright reform).
193. Id. at 26-27, 39; see also Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Copyright's CulturalTurn,
91 TEx. L. REV. 1397, 1412 (2013) (reviewing JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED
SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2012)) ("The economic rationale
counsels nearly boundless expansion as long as it can be justified by some (even implausible) claim
that more property rights induce more creativity.").
194. See Litman, supra note 192, at 26-27, 39. Jessica Litman has bluntly pointed out the central
problem with this trend. Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 337, 343-44
(2002). She noted that "[a]s technology has enabled individuals to enjoy works in new ways, however,
copyright owners have asked for greatly enhanced control over their works. Copyright owners have
insisted to [U.S.] Congress and the courts that, because copyrights are their property, nobody should
be allowed to make a valuable use of a copyrighted work without paying the copyright owner."

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

31

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 6

476

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:445

'

Members of the U.S. legislature routinely shy away from any
interrogation of whether stronger protection would actually result in such
an economic incentive or substantial benefits for the public. Therefore,
it is not surprising that legislative expansions of copyright "often consist
of outright congressional rubber-stamping of industry-drafted legislation
and committee reports." 9 6 Among the numerous amendments to
copyright law, the U.S. Copyright Term Extension Act ("CTEA")
epitomizes the one-sided domination of the law-making process by the
copyright-based industries, with congressional hearings persistently
97
dominated by pro-copyright testimonies.' The CTEA was adopted on the
198
basis of those testimonies.
A fundamental right to technology would alleviate this majoritarian
tyranny problem by subjecting the legislative process to the strict scrutiny
of judicial review. To protect this right, the courts would have the power
to review whether a law that affects the distribution and enjoyment of the
benefits of technological progress passes the three yardsticks of strict
scrutiny.1 99 First, the legislature must demonstrate a compelling interest in
regulation that is necessary or crucial for achieving its legislative goals.2
20
Second, the law must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
Third, the law must be the least restrictive means of achieving that
interest. 2 0 2Therefore, the fundamental right to technology would serve as
a powerful check on the legislature's power to enact laws that favor the
commercial interests of corporations. By requiring the legislature to
scrutinize the purposes of law-making and adopt proper legal standards
and rules, the right to technology would promote the enactment of laws
aimed at achieving a fair distribution of the benefits of technological
progress.
Litman, supra note 192, at 14.
195. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History,72 CORNELL L.REV.
857, 860-61 (1987) ("Indeed, the statute's legislative history is troubling because it reveals that most
of the statutory language was not drafted by members of Congress or their staffs at all. Instead, the
language evolved through a process of negotiation among authors, publishers, and other parties with
economic interests in the property rights the statute defines."); Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation
and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275, 314-15 (1989) ("Much legislation advances the
agendas of private interest groups.... Congress in effect agreed that if the industry representatives
would invest the time and energy to develop a bill that all of them endorsed, Congress would refrain
from exercising independent judgment on the substance of the legislation.").
196. NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANIEL,COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 184 (2008).
197. See Dennis S. Karjala, JudicialReview of Copyright Term Extension Legislation,36 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 199, 206-22 (2002).
198. Id. at 206.
199. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91,299 (1978).
200. See id. at 299.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 357 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun JJ., concurring).
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Enforcing Other Responsibilities

The judiciary and the administration must act to better protect the
fundamental right to technology. Courts should proactively fulfill their
responsibility to protect societal interests in technological benefits. To that
end, they should apply IP in a manner conducive of equitable distribution
and the expansive enjoyment of the benefits of technological progress.
The fair use doctrine demonstrates how the government should act.2 03 As
a limitation on copyright, fair use allows the public to make limited use
of copyrighted works without permission from the copyright holders.204
Fair use is of vital importance in a free and just society.205 It not only
accommodates but actually encourages a wide range of freedompromoting activities such as news reporting, criticism, teaching, and
research. 02 6As a result, fair use has been hailed as a "free speech
2 08
safeguard" 207 in copyright law and as an engine of social creativity.
When the U.S. Congress was codifying the fair use doctrine into the
Copyright Act, it deliberately afforded the doctrine sufficient flexibility
to vest the courts with adequate latitude to protect the public interest in
benefiting from technological progress, stipulating that "during a period
of rapid technological change," Congress and "the courts must be free to

§

107 (2012).

203.
204.

See 17 U.S.C.
Id.

205.

See Barton Beebe, Does JudicialIdeology Affect CopyrightFair Use Outcomes?: Evidence
Case Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 517, 522 (2008) (pointing out that the fair use

from the Fair Use

doctrine defines "the contours of the private and public domains of human expression and, in doing
so, directly impact[s] our capability for human flourishing"); Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, FairUse
Infrastructurefor Rights Management Systems, 15 HAR. JL.& TECH. 41, 43-47 (2001) (discussing
the social functions of fair use); William W. FisherIII, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101
HARV. L. REv. 1659, 1661 (1988) (arguing that the fair use doctrine "would contribute to the
realization of a more just social order"); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2537, 2540 (2009) ("A well-recognized strength of the fair use doctrine is the considerable
flexibility it provides in balancing the interests of copyright owners in controlling exploitations of
their works and the interests of subsequent authors in drawing from earlier works when expressing
themselves, as well as the interests of the public in having access to new works and making reasonable
uses of them."); Haochen Sun, Fair Use as a Collective User Right, 90 N.C. L. REV. 125, 201 (2011)
("Fair use is one of the greatest mechanisms for enriching human society. It sustains and enhances
both cultural dynamics and political democracy in a free and just society.").
206. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
207. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (describing fair use as a "free
speech safeguard[]" and a "First Amendment accommodation[]"); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) ("[T]he First Amendment protections already embodied in
the Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and
ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use . . . .").
208. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,575 (1994) ("From the infancy
of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought
necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose, '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts . . . .' (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONsT.art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
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adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case by case basis." 209 This
benefit of the U.S. fair use system has been further affirmed by case law.
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,2 10 the Supreme
Court emphasized that "[t]he bill endorses the purpose and general scope
of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the
doctrine in the statute, especially in a period of rapid technological
change."211 Indeed, legislative inability to foresee and deal with all
potential circumstances justifies the open-ended and flexible structure of
the fair use doctrine. This inherent indeterminacy has become an
advantage, relative to the closed system model, 2 1 2 because it permits
potentially novel ways of exploiting copyrighted works, rendering the
framework of copyright law largely coterminous with legislative changes
2 13
necessitated by continuous technological developments.
On the other hand, the relevant administrative agencies should
proactively fulfill its political responsibility to protect group-based
interests in technologies. There are a number of legal and practical
obstacles that prevent certain groups of people from fully enjoying the
benefits of technological progress. Worse still, the relevant administrative
agencies have oftentimes turned a blind eye to the interests of
underprivileged groups. For example, the World Health Organization
estimates "there are more than 314 million blind and visually-impaired
2 14
persons in the world, 90 percent of whom live in developing countries."
However, according to a survey conducted by the World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO"), fewer than sixty countries have adopted
limitation and exception provisions in their domestic copyright laws to
allow or encourage the transformation of works into Braille.215 In the
absence of such provisions, the cost of negotiating with publishers is often
prohibitively high.2 1 6
209. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am. 480 F. Supp. 429,456 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
210. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
211. Id. at 448 n.30.
212. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT 12:3 (3d ed. 2005) (lamenting that "[n]o
doctrine in copyright is less determinate than fair use"); Haochen Sun, CopyrightLaw as an Engine
of Public Interest Protection, 16 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 123, 124-245 (2019) (arguing that
"use has become something of a legal monster, causing no end of troubles owing to its vague and
shifting contours").
213. Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp., at 456 ("Congress expressly left the fair use doctrine
flexible because it recognized the possibility of such a situation. The doctrine is particularly useful in
evaluating new technology and its effect on copyright law.").
214. Press Release, World Intellectual Prop. Org., Negotiators Set to Finalize New Treaty
10, 2013),
(June
Impaired Persons
for Visually
Improving Access to Books
http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2013/article_0012.html.
215. Id.
216. Id. The WIPO report also explains that:
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The end result is that copyright law has effected a widespread "book
famine"2 17 among the visually-impaired worldwide. "According to the
World Blind Union, of the million or so books published each year in the
world, less than 5 per cent are made available in formats accessible to
visually-impaired persons." 2 1 8This problem is particularly prevalent in
less-developed countries. It has been reported that the world's 314 million
visually-impaired people live mostly in poor countries where books in
friendly formats (Braille, audio, and large print) are scarce. 2 1 9 A recent
estimate suggests that the entire continent of Africa has only 500 works
available for blind English-speakers.220 However, the book famine is not
confined to developing countries. Given the negative effects of copyright
law, "book hunger" 221 remainsa social problem in the United States, for
example, where only about five percent of the 40,000 books published
annually are made available to the blind.22 2
Digital libraries offer a potential solution. For example, thirteen U.S.
universities jointly created the HathiTrust Digital Library ("HDL"), a
repository for the digital versions of 10 million books.223 The HDL
provides visually-impaired users with access to books by using adaptive
technologies such as software that magnifies or converts text into spoken
words. However, copyright owners have challenged the legality of the
HDL. 22 4 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the HDL's digital
225
reproductions of works constitute fair use under the U.S. Copyright Act.

[B]ecause copyright law is 'territorial', these exemptions usually do not cover the import
or export of works converted into accessible formats, even between countries with similar
rules. Organizations in each country must negotiate licenses with the rightholders to
exchange special formats across borders, or produce their own materials, a costly
undertaking that severely limits access by the beneficiaries to printed works of all kinds.

Id.
217. See Karyn A. Temple, The Marrakesh Treaty Implementation Act, LBR. CONGRESS (Oct.
see
10, 2018), https://blogs.loc.gov/copyright/2018/10/the-marrakesh-treaty-implementation-act;
also Kwesi Kwaa Prah, The Difficulties ofPublishing in Afica: Random Thoughts on the Casas
Publishing Experience, in LANGUAGE AND POWER: THE IMPLICATIONS OF LANGUAGE FOR PEACE

AND DEVELOPMENT 301, 301 (Birgit Bock-Utne & Gunnar Garbo eds., 2009) ("In Africa today, there
is what is [commonly] described . .. as a 'book famine,' that is a shortage of books, the pricing of
books out of the financial reach of most people or the sheer unavailability of books.").
218. Press Release, supra note 214.
219. Id.
220. Between the Lines, ECONOMIST, July 20, 2013, at 54, https://www.economist.com/intenati
onal/2013/07/20/between-the-lines.
221. Lea Shaver, Copyright and Inequality, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 117, 120 (2014) ("Although
much less extreme, book hunger is also a problem in the United States.").
222. New Copyright Law Big Breakthrough for the Blind, NAT'L FED'N BLIND,
https://www.nfb.org/images/nfb/publications/fr/frl6/issuel/fl60106.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
223. See Shaver, supranote 221, at 145-46.
224. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87,92 (2d Cir. 2014).
225. Id. at 101, 103.
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A core reason for the ruling is that the HDL's provision of access to works
for the visually-impaired "assure[s] equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such
individuals."226 Despite this fair use-based ruling, the HDL has not yet
provided universal access to all books for all visually-impaired people. At
present, only visually-impaired patrons of the University of Michigan
library enjoy access to the full text of 10 million copyrighted books.227
Against this backdrop, the administration needs to seriously consider
how the HDL can be expanded in scale to benefit more visually-impaired
persons. The United States ratified the 2013 Marrakesh Treaty to
Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind,
Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled in February 2019.228
Therefore, the administration should proactively create initiatives to
promote the group-based collective interests of the visually impaired in
using technologies to gain access to books.

V.

CONCLUSION

The fundamental right to technology, as I have demonstrated,
advocates for the dynamic involvement of the U.S. Constitution and the
U.S. courts in promoting the equal distribution and enjoyment of the
benefits of technological progress. It urges the U.S. legislature and
judiciary to reshape IP laws to render them more conducive to protection
of this fundamental right, recognizing that IP rights protection has to date
played the most prominent role in regulating technology and social
justice. If other countries were to follow the constitutional right-based
approach proposed herein, they would revolutionize the international
human rights system to ensure that it redistributes the benefits of
technological progress in the interests of all global citizens.
The fundamental right to technology is by no means an absolute
right. It is not intended to substantially harm the interests of IP rights
owners by disrupting their business plans to merchandize their IP assets
in the market.229 Nor is it intended to erode the legal confinements of the
Fifth Amendment by "[taking] private property . . . for public use, without
just compensation." 2 30 This is because the right does not defy distribution
of benefits through market exchange. Instead, this new fundamental right
226. Id. at 102 (citing Congress' statement made in the Americans with Disabilities Act).
227. See id. at 91.
228. See WIPO-Administered Treaties, WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.j
sp?lang=en&treaty-id=843 (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
229. See supraPart IVA.
230. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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is a relational right. It is designed to recharge the Due Process to confront
the injustices being ushered in by new technologies. It is intended to
redress the potential injustices of the IP Clause in distributing the benefits
of those technologies. With this new fundamental right in our hands, we
will be in a much better position to harness technology in the service
of humanity.
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